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  1 Introduction
Imagine a country with autonomous regions in which each regional government decides how to
spend the resources transferred from the central government. Regional expenditures refer to
the dierent issues lying within the jurisdiction of the regional public system (e.g., health care
provision, public education, highways, etc.) Imagine now that the total resources the central
government may transfer is below the aggregate expenditure autonomous governments face.
How should the central government assign the available amount?
A somewhat related situation occurs in the proposals for nancial support to the NSF,
or any other foundation promoting scientic research. Each proposal must contain a budget
referring to dierent issues, such as salaries and wages, fringe benets, equipment, travel, etc.
The proposal may request funds under any of the issues, so long as the item and amount are
considered necessary to perform the proposed work and are not precluded by specic program
guidelines or applicable cost principles. If the whole budget the foundation has to allocate
is publicly known and falls below the aggregated budget proposals claim, how should it be
allocated?
These are instances of multi-issue bankruptcy problems, i.e., problems in which an arbitrator
has to allocate a given amount of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of agents,
when the available amount is not enough to satisfy all their claims and these claims refer to
dierent issues.
The problem of dividing when there is not enough is one of the oldest problems in the
history of economic thought. Although problems of this sort (and possible solutions for them)
are already documented in ancient sources such as the Talmud, Aristotle' books or Maimonides'
essays, their formalization was not presented till the early eighties by Barry O'Neill. O'Neill
(1982) was the rst to provide an extremely simple model in which a variety of situations
(such as the bankruptcy of a rm, the division of an insucient estate to cover all the existing
debts, sharing the cost of an indivisible public facility and the collection of a given amount
of taxes) t.1 Multi-issue bankruptcy problems (\MIB problems" hereafter) are the outcome
of leading this model one step beyond, so that agents' claims are allowed to refer to dierent
issues. These problems have been studied by Kaminski (2000, 2006), Calleja et al., (2005) and
Ju et al., (2007), among others.
1The reader is referred to Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003, 2006) for reviews of the fast-expanding liter-








As bankruptcy problems, MIB problems are solved by means of rules. A multi-issue
bankruptcy rule is a mapping that associates with each MIB problem an allocation indicating
the amount that each agent obtains for each issue, subject to two conditions: the (non-negative)
amount that every agent obtains for each issue is not greater than her claim and the whole
amount is distributed.2 A natural question is how to extend classical bankruptcy rules to the
more general setting of MIB problems. We provide in this note two possible answers. The rst
one considers the amount of each issue that an agent claims, as an independent claim of a new
agent. This results in a new (unidimensional) bankruptcy problem to which the original rule
could be applied. The other alternative is based on a two-stage process: First, the primitive
rule is applied to the bankruptcy problem in which claims for the same issue are aggregated
into a single claim. The amount allocated to each issue is then distributed among the agents
by applying the same rule. We show that there is only one rule whose two extensions according
to the two alternatives just described yield the same outcomes. It is the so-called proportional
rule, probably the rule with the longest tradition of use (whose spirit can be traced back to
Aristotle), which allocates the available amount proportionally to agents' claims.
2 The Model
Let N represent the set of all potential agents (an innite set) and let N be the family of all nite
(non-empty) subsets of N: An element N 2 N describes a nite set of agents N = f1;2;:::;ng,
where we take jNj = n  2. Let M represent the set of all potential issues (an innite set) and
let M be the family of all nite (non-empty) subsets of M: An element M 2 M describes a
nite set of issues M = f1;2;:::;mg, where we take jMj = m  2. Let Mmn represent the set
of matrices with m rows and n columns and M
+
mn its subset of matrices whose entries are all
non-negative.
A multi-issue bankruptcy problem (MIB problem) is a 4 tuple (M;N;E;C); where
M is the set of issues, N is the set of agents, E 2 R+ is an amount to divide, and C 2 M
+
mn
is a matrix of claims. The family of all these problems is denoted by MIB. Every row in
C represents an issue. A generic element of C, cij, denotes the amount of issue i that agent




j2N cij  E. To
simplify notation we write, for any given problem (M;N;E;C) 2 MIB; cMj =
P
i2M cij to
the aggregate claim of agent j 2 N, and ciN =
P
j2N cij to the aggregate claim according to








issue i 2 M.
A multi-issue bankruptcy rule (MIB rule) is a mapping R that associates with every
(M;N;E;C) 2 MIB a unique matrix R(M;N;E;C) 2 Mmn such that:
(i) 0  Rij(M;N;E;C)  cij, for all (i;j) 2 M  N.
(ii)
P
(i;j)2MN Rij(M;N;E;C) = E:
The matrix R(M;N;E;C) represents a desirable way of dividing E among the agents in
N, according to the issues in M. Requirement (i) is that each agent receives an award for
each issue that is non-negative and bounded above by her claim. Requirement (ii) is that the




A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N;E;c); where N is the set of agents, E 2 R+
is an amount to divide, and c 2 Rn
+ is a vector of claims whose ith component is ci; with
P
i2N ci  E > 0: The family of all those bankruptcy problems is denoted by B: Given a MIB
problem, we can associate with it a bankruptcy problem, by disentangling agents and issues,
as follows:
Denition 1 Given (M;N;E;C) 2 MIB, its associated bankruptcy problem is (NM;E;cM) 2
B, where NM = f1;2;:::;m  ng and cM = (c11;:::;c1n;c21;:::;c2n;:::;cm1;:::;cmn) 2 Rmn.
A bankruptcy rule is a mapping r that associates with every (N;E;c) 2 B a unique point
r(N;E;c) 2 Rn such that:
(i) 0  r(N;E;c)  c:
(ii)
P
i2N ri(N;E;c) = E:
Throughout the note we shall only consider anonymous bankruptcy rules meeting the fol-
lowing mild property:
Independence of null claims. For each (N;E;c) 2 B and each N0  N, such that yi = 0
for all i 2 N n N0, we have Rj (N;E;c) = Rj(N0;E;(ci)i2N0) for all j 2 N0.
Some of the classical bankruptcy rules are the following. The proportional rule makes awards
proportional to claims, i.e., p(N;E;c) = c, where  = E P
ci. The constrained equal-awards rule
distributes the amount equally among all agents, subject to no agent receiving more than she
claims, i.e., a(N;E;c) = (minfci;g)i2N, where  > 0 is chosen so that
P
minfci;g = E. The








receiving a negative amount, i.e., l(N;E;c) = (maxf0;ci   g)i2N, where  > 0 is chosen so
that
P
maxf0;ci g = E. Finally, the Talmud rule behaves like the constrained equal-awards
rule or the constrained equal losses rule, depending on whether the amount to divide exceeds or
falls short of half of the aggregate claim, and using half-claims instead of the claims themselves.
Formally, t(N;E;c) = (minf1
2ci;g)i2N if E  1
2
P
ci and t(N;E;c) = (maxf1
2ci;ci   g)i2N
if E  1
2
P




In this note we address the problem of how to extend bankruptcy rules to the multidimensional
framework of MIB problems. We present two alternatives. The rst one is the composition of
the bankruptcy rule and the application that associates with each MIB problem a bankruptcy
problem, as in Denition 1. Formally:
Denition 2 Given a bankruptcy rule r, its one-stage extension to MIB problems, R1, is






where k = n  (i   1) + j.
This one-stage extension, however, is not sensible to the dierent issues that appear in a
MIB problem. We propose another possible way of extending rules, that captures such aspect:
rst, the primitive rule is applied to the bankruptcy problem in which claims for the same
issue are aggregated into a single claim. The amount allocated to each issue is distributed then
among agents, according to the same rule.3 Formally:
Denition 3 Given a bankruptcy rule r, its two-stage extension to MIB problems, R2, is




The following example shows that most of the classical bankruptcy rules fail to agree on
these two extensions to the multi-issue setting.
3The obvious dual two-stage extension, i.e., rst allocate among claimants and then among their specic
claims, will not be considered here as it seems less intuitive to impose agents a precise way of distributing among

































































A = T 2(M;N;E;C).
Indeed, as Theorem 1 in the next section shows, the proportional rule is the only exception
to these negative results.
4 The result
Theorem 1 The proportional rule is the only (anonymous) bankruptcy rule, satisfying inde-
pendence of null claims, whose two extensions to the multi-issue framework coincide.
Proof.
Let P 1 and P 2 denote the one-stage and two-stage extensions, respectively, of the propor-
tional rule to MIB problems. Let (M;N;E;C) 2 MIB and (i;j) 2 M  N be given. Then, it































ij(M;N;E;C) = P 2
ij(M;N;E;C), as claimed.
Conversely, let r be any bankruptcy rule dierent from the proportional rule. Let R1 and
R2 denote its one-stage and two-stage extensions, respectively, to MIB problems. We show that
R1 6= R2.
Since r 6= p, it can be shown (e.g., Ju et al., 2007; Corollary 11) that there exist (N;E;c)
2 B, and i;j 2 N such that








Assume, without loss of generality, that N = f1;:::;ng and i < j. Then, since
X
l




it follows that there exists k 2 N n fi;jg such that
rk(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 6= rk(N;E;c): (1)
For ease of notation, we assume that k < j.
Let C 2 M
+
(n 1)2 be the following matrix:
C =
0
B B B B B B
B B B B B B
B B B B B
B B B B B B

















C C C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C
A
Then, (N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C) 2 MIB. By Denition 2, anonymity, and independence of
null claims, it is straightforward to show that
R
1(N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C) =
0
B
B B B B B B
B B B B B
B B B B B B
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k;1(N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C) = rk(N;E;c). (2)
By Denition 3, anonymity, and independence of null claims, it is straightforward to show that
R
2(N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C) =
0
B
B B B B B B
B B B B B B
B B B B B
B B B B B B
B B B
@
r1(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
r2(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
. . .
. . .
ri 1(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
x y
ri+1(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
. . .
. . .
rj 1(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
rj+1(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
. . .
. . .
rn(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)) 0
1
C
C C C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C C C




where (x;y) = r(fi;jg;ri(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j));(ci;cj)), i.e., x and y are such that




k;1(N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C) = rk(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)). (3)
For the sake of contradiction, assume now that R1 = R2. Then,
R
1
k;1(N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C) = R
2
k;1(N n fjg;f1;2g;E;C).
Equivalently, from (2) and (3),
rk(N;E;c) = rk(N n fjg;E;(ci + cj;(ck)k6=i;j)),
which contradicts (1).
5 Further insights
We have basically shown in this note that the proportional rule is the only rule in the classi-
cal bankruptcy model that can be extended indierently to the multi-issue bankruptcy model,








proportional division in a claims problem which, despite being deeply rooted in the classical
unidimensional context, has not been suciently explored in the multidimensional context.
Practical (real-life) examples tting the multi-issue bankruptcy model might call for the two
extensions we propose in this note.4 The fact that the two options only agree for the propor-
tional rule is a valuable information that should ease the debate about the resolution of these
practical examples.
As mentioned in the introduction, the classical bankruptcy model is able of accommodat-
ing many dierent situations with, perhaps, the bankruptcy of a rm as the usual running
example. In actual bankruptcy laws, however, the creditors' legal characteristics are typically
divided among categories (e.g., secured claims, unsecured claims, taxes, and trustee expenses)
which calls for a more complex model in which, rather than single claims, vectors of claims, each
indicating the claim for a given characteristic, are considered (e.g., Kaminski, 2006). Hence
another instance of the usefulness of a multi-issue bankruptcy model.5 Our choice for solving
the multi-issue bankruptcy model has been to consider rules that assign for each agent a vector
of quantities, each one associated with each issue. In doing so, we are implicitly precluding
reallocations or transfers among claims of a same agent that might give rise to manipulations
of the outcome.6 Another choice that has been considered in the literature refers to rules that
only specify the overall amount each agent gets, rather than the vector (e.g., Kaminski, 2000,
2006; Calleja et al., 2005; Ju et al., 2007).7 Here the assumption of precluding manipulations
via reallocation of claims can be made explicitly and if so, it leads (essentially) to a suitable ex-
tension of the proportional rule to this context (e.g., Ju et al., 2007). The American bankruptcy
4Think of, for instance, the case of university departments asking for funds to the university to be spent on
dierent issues, such as maintenance, teaching material, seminars, etc., for which it is plausible to consider both
the one-stage and two-stage approaches described above.
5A somewhat related, but more general problem, also described by Kaminski (2006), is the so-called share-
holders problem (or the problem of the liquidation of a company) in which a shareholder can hold stock in a
company, its bonds, and/or can be a lender. Such a setup would go beyond the framework of the multi-issue
bankruptcy model, as an agent's type would not necessarily be a vector of claims (for a shareholder, the stock
part is typically a proportion of stock or similar).
6In real bankruptcy cases, for example, the claims of dierent types exist in some legal form that actually
precludes such a reallocation.
7Nevertheless, these multi-dimensional models could be in some cases unambiguously translated into our
framework. For instance, if we consider a hydraulic method (e.g., Kaminski, 2000) with dierent vessels for
dierent types of claims of the same claimant (as is the case with American bankruptcy law), then the content








rule, which is indeed a mixed lexicographic-proportional rule can be singled out by adding a
requirement of priority among asset types (e.g., Kaminski, 2000; Ju et al., 2007).
Other justications for our suballocation approach are, for instance, that a donor may
require that the claimant makes specic cuts in the proposed expenses, or the desirability of
the division of dierent streams of revenue within, say, a bank.8 To summarize, what lies
behind this approach is the idea that the main allocation in a multi-issue bankruptcy problem
can impose certain constraints on the secondary allocation. Other options dierent to ours
would have arisen upon imposing weaker constraints, such as making specic cuts in a given
expense but allowing freedom with the remaining expenses.
This work has several potential avenues for further research. To begin with, one might
think of plausible extensions of axioms in the classical bankruptcy model to the multi-issue
setting. It is plausible to conjecture that some combinations of these extensions would lead
to parallel characterizations (to the existing ones in the classical bankruptcy model) of rules
extended according to the two natural procedures we analyze in this note. Now, whereas some
of the classical axioms in the unidimensional context could apply here directly, others would
not. A more interesting (and challenging) route would be to formalize new axioms with inher-
ent appeal for the multidimensional setting and to explore their implications, ideally obtaining
characterization results for dierent rules. Somewhat related, it would be interesting to ex-
plore non-anonymous (multi-issue) rules, especially if we deal with claims coming in various
categories, or if we simply have reasons a priori (e.g., heterogeneity in preferences of the agents
in society over the dierent issues) to treat dierent issues dierently. Finally, the classical
bankruptcy model implicitly assumes that issues of production, preferences, and other charac-
teristics are unobservable or irrelevant. This does not need to be the case in the multi-issue
setting we have presented here and therefore it would be worth exploring the existence of axioms
(and, ultimately, rules) reecting some of these issues.
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